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Hanlon, Bernadette (2008). "The Decline of Older, Inner Suburbs in Metropolitan America. Housing Policy Debate." 19(3), 423-456. Abstract: "This article develops an index of suburban decline for 3,428 U.S. suburbs. The results of this index were used to measure the prevalence and extent of decline for older, inner suburbs and newer suburbs across the nation and in different regions from 1980 to 2000. The general pattern is one of decline in selected older, inner suburbs, especially those with housing built between 1950 and 1969 and those with increasing minority populations. Regional analysis reveals that the South and the Midwest had the highest proportion of older, inner suburbs in crisis. Suburbs with housing built before 1939 emerged as areas of continuing affluence."

Keating, W. Dennis and Thomas Bier (2008). "Greater Cleveland's First Suburbs Consortium: Fighting Sprawl and Suburban Decline." Housing Policy Debate. 19(3), 457-477. Abstract: "This article addresses the problems of older suburbs bordering central cities; these suburbs are now experiencing many of the same symptoms of decline as the central cities themselves. We analyze this issue by recounting the experience of the inner (or first) suburbs of Cleveland and the First Suburbs Consortium (FSC), which was formed in 1997 to counteract sprawl in the metropolitan region. We analyze the impact of FSC both on its suburban members and also on state policies affecting older suburbs. FSC can point to several programs that it has developed to improve housing and commercial development among its 16 members. It also has joined with other similar Ohio suburbs to advocate and to lobby for changes in state policies (so far unsuccessfully) to provide more assistance to older suburbs. Nevertheless, FSC has been recognized as a national role model."

Mallach, Alan. "Meeting the Challenge of Distressed Property Investors in America's Neighborhoods." 1- 91. New York, NY: LISC, 2010. Introduction: "The mortgage crisis that has gripped the United States since 2007 has resulted in property owners losing millions of properties through foreclosure, with a loss of hundreds of billions of dollars in individual and community assets. Through the foreclosure process, the majority of these properties have been taken back by the mortgage lender and become 'real-estate-owned' or REO properties. For the first year or so after foreclosures took off in 2007, with lenders unprepared to deal with these properties and few buyers of any sort in the marketplace, REO properties often went begging. By the end of 2008, however, that was no longer the case. Private property investors - from "mom & pop" investors buying one or two properties to Wall Street firms and consortia of foreign investors buying entire portfolios - had moved back into the market in large numbers. Since early 2009, the ranks of investors have steadily grown, while it has become less accurate to refer to them as 'REO investors'. Rather than waiting for properties to come into lenders' REO inventories, distressed property investors - as they are more appropriately known - have been increasingly buying houses through short sales, buying non-performing mortgages, or bidding against foreclosing lenders at foreclosure sales. Today, their presence is a major factor in the marketplace of nearly every metropolitan area experiencing large numbers of foreclosures. Their activities are having a powerful effect on neighborhoods generally and on the neighborhood stabilization efforts of cities and non-profit community development corporations (CDCs) in particular. Their effect, however, is a matter of considerable disagreement and even controversy. The purpose of this report is twofold: first, to offer insight into how distressed property investors operate, and how their activ

Immergluck, Dan. "Neighborhood in the Wake of the Debacle: Intrametropolitan Patterns of Foreclosed Properties." Urban Affairs Review 46,1 (2010): 3-36. A key aspect of the U.S. subprime crisis was the accumulation of vacant, foreclosed properties in many neighborhoods and localities. This article describes zip-code-level patterns of foreclosed homes, or what are typically called "real estate owned" (REO) properties, at the peak of the subprime crisis in late 2008 and estimates a model of REO accumulation from 2006 to 2008. Three key findings emerge. First, during the peak of the subprime foreclosure crisis in late 2008, large central cities, on average, experienced higher levels of REO per mortgageable property than suburban areas. This contradicts some suggestions that the crisis was primarily centered in suburban or exurban communities. Second, the suburbanization of REO varied across two key types of metropolitan areas, with boom-bust regions experiencing more suburbanization than weak- or mixed-market metros. Finally, determinants of zip-code-level REO accumulation included high-risk lending activity and the age of housing stock. After controlling for these and other variables, neither the central city versus suburban location of a zip code nor the proportion of residents commuting over 30 minutes was significantly associated with REO growth. The intrametropolitan location of a zip code appears to have been a less important factor in REO growth than the fact that a large amount of development in newer communities was financed during the subprime boom.